By Prof. Dr. Phoebe Koundouri and Dr. Angelos Alamanos

Achieving climate neutrality by 2050 requires coordinated action across energy, agriculture, land use and water resources. Fragmented sectoral policies and unclear financing strategies threaten progress. We present key findings from the SDSN Global Climate Hub’s first-ever simulation of the impacts of implementing 35 European National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) to 2050. We highlight data gaps, policy inconsistencies, and sector- and country-level inequalities, then offer a concise set of recommendations for a timely and equitable transition to a climate-neutral Europe.

European nations have set ambitious emission-reduction targets through their NECPs, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and related strategies. Yet these plans often lack financial rigor – failing to cost infrastructure, technology upgrades and adaptation projects – or simply neglect impacts on land and water. A panEuropean analysis published by the Global Climate Hub in 2025 integrates future policy scenarios and resource management proposals, highlighting targeted financing tools as essential insights for success (Kondouri et al., 2025). The study combines five modelling tools for the first time:

These models simulate the projected impacts of the NECPs of 35 European countries, annually, through to 2050.

Only a systemic, cross-sector approach, supported by scientific tools and driven by shared goals, harmonized timelines and robust oversight can deliver an economically efficient, environmentally sustainable and socially equitable pathway to climate neutrality across Europe.

Koundouri P., Alamanos A., Arampatzidis I., Devves S., Deranian C., Pliakou, T. (2025). An Integrated Assessment of the European National Commitments for Climate Neutrality. UN SDSN Global Climate Hub. June 2025, Athens.

FABLE Calculator: Food, Agriculture, Biodiversity, LandUse, and Energy (FABLE) Consortium, https://fableconsortium.org/tools/fablecalculators/.

LEAP Low Emissions Analysis Platform: Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), https://www.sei.org/tools/leap-low-emissions-analysis-platform/

See also SDSN Global Climate Hub: https://unsdsn.globalclimatehub.org/

By Mr. Davide Cozza, Ms. Maria Diaz, Ms. Clara Douzal and Dr. Aline Mosnier

The principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (CBDR–RC) provides a foundation for fairness in global climate action. As updated in the 2015 Paris Agreement, it establishes that every country should contribute to the 1.5 °C global mitigation goal based on its capacity ‘and reflect its highest possible ambition’ (UNFCCC, 2015). However, it is up to each country to decide how to put this principle into practice. This is particularly challenging for the agriculture and land-use sector, which simultaneously acts as a source and sink of emissions, and is critical to meeting other priorities, such as food and nutrition security, biodiversity conservation and economic development.

For the European Union, the CBDRRC principle holds dual significance. At the global level, the EU bears a high level of responsibility, as it is both a historically large emitter and a bloc with considerable financial and technological resources to drive ambitious climate mitigation action (Table 2.1). Within the Union, historical and projected emissions vary widely among EU member states. As a result, the EU’s overall mitigation efforts must balance principles of fairness and equity – both towards the rest of the world and towards its own members.

Source: PRIMAP Database for historical agricultural emissions (Gütschow et al., 2023); World Bank for historical GDP (2024a) and population (2024b); Douzal et al. (2024), for future emissions, population and GDP.

In 2018, the EU introduced the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR) to translate the principle of ‘a fair share’ into concrete mitigation targets (European Parliament and Council of the EU, 2018). The EU has committed to achieving a climate-neutral economy by 2050, (EU, 2021)and to reducing GHG emissions by at least 55% by 2030 and 90% by 2040, compared with 1990 levels (Council of the EU, 2025). To achieve these objectives, the ESR sets binding national emission-reduction targets for 2030 that apply to aggregated emissions from several sectors, including agriculture. In total, the ESR covers about 60% of the EU’s total GHG emissions and spans all 27 EU member states, as well as Iceland and Norway.

GDP per capita is the criterion used to determine national emission-reduction targets, including for agriculture, within the ESR-regulated sectors. The ESR also includes several flexibilities to help member states manage year-to-year fluctuations in emissions, such as the use of credits from the land-use sector. Notably, EU countries in which agriculture accounts for a larger share of total emissions have access to higher land-use credits. In this way, the ESR reflects the lower short-term mitigation potential of agricultural sources (European Commission, 2023). Additional mechanisms include: access to a safety reserve, subject to the collective achievement of the EU’s reduction target; the option to bank surpluses in emissions; the capacity to borrow a limited amount of allocations; and the ability to buy and sell allocations among member states.

However, there are no specific mitigation targets for the agricultural sector at the EU level; it is up to each member state to determine the share of agriculture within its national ESR allocation. Given agriculture’s central role in the EU’s sustainable development and the diversity of agricultural systems across member states, it is crucial to assess how countries can plan their food and land-use systems in alignment with the objectives of the European Climate Law and the Common Agricultural Policy while upholding principles of fairness and equity. The widespread farmers’ protests across Europe in early 2024 underscored the urgency of ensuring a just and socially inclusive transition to more sustainable and resilient land-use systems, and of reconciling climate ambition with economic viability in both rural and urban contexts (European Union, 2024).

While fair-share methodologies have long been used to assess economy-wide GHG emission reduction targets (Höhne et al., 2014; Van Den Berg et al., 2020; Climate Action Tracker, n.d.; Yuwono et al., 2023), in this study, we examine fairness in projected future agricultural emissions across countries. We identified three ‘fair share’ principles and applied them to agricultural emissions through 2050, using two pathways– ‘Current Trends’ and ‘Global Sustainability’ – modelled by the Food, Agriculture, Biodiversity, Land Use and Energy (FABLE) Consortium (Douzal et al., 2024; FABLE 2025). Agricultural emissions in these alternative futures result from different policy choices and levels of ambition. In this study, we compute fair allowances for 2050, compare results across EU countries and regions, and identify where the largest gaps emerge.

The Ability to Pay (AP) approach allocates lower emission allowances to countries with lower vulnerability (Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative, 2024) and projects higher cumulative per-capita GDP over 1961–2049. It builds on the capability principle: countries with greater economic, technological and institutional capacity should shoulder a larger share of global mitigation efforts (Höhne et al., 2014; Climate Action Tracker, n.d.). Between 1961 and 2019, the EU accounted for roughly 23.8% of global cumulative GDP, while representing only about 8.4% of the world’s population. Over 2020–2049, the EU is projected to account for 16.3% of global GDP and just 5.2% of the world’s population. Relative to most regions, the EU possesses greater financial resources, technological expertise and institutional capacity to implement ambitious climate mitigation policies, including making significant reductions in agricultural emissions.

The Historical Responsibility (HR) approach assigns smaller emission allowances to countries with higher per-capita historical emissions. It is grounded in the responsibility principle: countries that have contributed more to global warming in the past should bear a greater share of today’s mitigation efforts (Climate Action Tracker, n.d.; Höhne et al., 2014). Between1961 and 2019, the EU accounted for roughly 10.3% of global historical agricultural emissions (Gütschow et al., 2023) and is projected to contribute about 6.3% between 2020 and 2049 (Douzal et al., 2024). This reflects a long legacy of higher agricultural emissions and high emissions per hectare of agricultural land (FAO, 2024), driven in part by large-scale livestock production and intensive use of natural and mineral fertilizers (MielcarekBocheńska and Rzeźnik, 2021). By contrast, many countries in Africa and Asia have historically relied on more subsistence-oriented farming systems, with significantly lower agricultural output per capita and lower per-capita emissions. Under the HR approach, this historical imbalance places a greater mitigation responsibility on European countries.

The Immediate Per Capita Convergence (IEPC) framework allocates emission allowances based on population size, reflecting the principle that each individual has an equal right to emit (Pozo et al., 2020; Höhne et al., 2014; Climate Action Tracker, n.d.). Because the EU represents a relatively small share of the global population– especially when compared to rapidly growing regions in Asia and Africa – European countries receive lower agricultural emission allowances under this framework, placing greater pressure on them to reduce emissions faster than other regions.

In addition to these general fairness principles, we incorporate two indicators – yield gap and self-sufficiency ratio (SSR) – to refine the allocation of ‘fair shares’ for agricultural emissions, balancing mitigation objectives with food security goals (FABLE 2025). A large yield gap indicates room to increase agricultural productivity through improved practices and technology, allowing countries to reduce emissions per unit of output. Countries with smaller yield gaps receive slightly higher emissions allowances because they have limited potential to increase productivity further. The SSR reflects a country’s ability to meet its food demand domestically. Countries with a low SSR are allocated higher emissions allowances, to ensure they can produce enough food domestically and are not pushed into greater dependence on imports. In the EU, yield gaps are generally low, which increases emission allowances. However, the region’s relatively high SSR reduces the need for higher allowances, partly counterbalancing the effect of low yield gaps.

According to this study, the EU’s fair share allowances amount to 9.6–11.1 megatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (Mt CO2-eq) per year under the AP approach, 139–147 Mt CO2-eq under the HR approach, and 202–214 Mt CO2-eq under the IEPC framework. When compared with 1990’s agricultural emissions of 489 MtCO2-eq (EEA, 2025), these fair-share allocations imply a reduction of approximately 98% under AP, 70% under HR, and 56–59% under IEPC by 2050.

The EU is far from achieving its fair share level of agricultural emissions under both the ‘Current Trends’ pathway – a low-ambition trajectory largely shaped by existing policies – and the ‘Global Sustainability’ pathway – a high-ambition trajectory designed to bring countries and regions closer to meeting global sustainability targets, including the Paris Agreement and the SDGs (FABLE, 2024).

Figure 2.1 illustrates the gap between the EU’s fair-share allowance and its projected emissions from agriculture under both pathways, and compares this gap with that of other major agricultural producers (Brazil, China, India, Russia, and the United States).

Note: This figure presents fair-share allowances as a percentage of projected 2050 agricultural emissions. Higher values indicate that a region is closer to achieving its fair share (dashed red line). Values above 100% (green zone) mean that a region’s fair allowance is greater than its projected emissions, implying that it will meet or even surpass its fair share goal under one of the three approaches

Source: Authors

Using the AP approach, the EU’s fair-share allowances would cover only 2% of its projected 2050 emissions under the Current Trends pathway and 4% under the Global Sustainability pathway, placing it, alongside the United States (1% and 2%) and Brazil (3% and 9%), among the countries or regions farthest from meeting their fair-share allocations. Russia (10% and 14%) and China (22% and 36%) perform relatively better, though their positions remain highly insufficient. India, by contrast, is the only country to meet or exceed its fair share under both pathways (130% and 200%), reflecting its low per-capita GDP.

Under the HR approach, the EU’s position relative to its fair share improves, but it remains highly insufficient. The EU’s fair allowance would account for only 32% of its projected 2050 emissions under the Current Trends pathway, rising to 54% under Global Sustainability. The EU would still emit three times (Current Trends) or two times (Global Sustainability) the level of emissions it is entitled to. By contrast, China (72% and 108%) and India (82% and 118%) come close to meeting – or in the case of Global Sustainability, exceed – their fair shares. Brazil, however, exhibits a larger gap under either pathway between its fair share and its actual emissions (3% and 11%), reflecting high agricultural emissions driven by its large-scale export oriented production of soybeans, beef and other commodities.

Using the IEPC framework, the EU comes closer to meeting its allocation but still falls short, with its fair allowance accounting for 48% of its projected 2050 emissions under the Current Trends pathway and 79% under Global Sustainability. This implies that the EU would still need to cut its 2050agricultural emissions by roughly half (Current Trends), and by about 21% (Global Sustainability) to fully align with its fair-share allocation. Under the more optimistic pathway, India (71% and 102%) attains its fair share and China (58% and 85%) comes close to achieving it, while Russia (45% and 57%), Brazil (12% and 34%), and the United States (45% and 64%) remain far from reaching their fair-share targets.

To examine fairness within the EU, we consider agricultural emissions based on pathways developed for five EU countries – Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece and Sweden – and for Norway. The rest of the EU countries are grouped together into a single ‘rest of the EU’ region. These six countries were selected because they have FABLE teams, contributed to the 2023 Scenathon, and fall within the scope of the ESR framework. Overall, European countries exhibit broadly similar characteristics: high per-capita GDPs, high per-capita agricultural emissions, with small to medium populations in 2050 compared with other world regions. Nevertheless, there are some notable differences among them, shaping their distinct positions across the three fairness approaches.

Under the AP approach, all European countries exceed their fair emission allowances by a wide margin, with fair-share allocations representing only about 1–4% of their actual agricultural emissions in 2050. But although all EU countries remain very far from limiting emissions to their fair share, Greece performs roughly four times as well as the Nordic countries, largely due to its comparatively lower per-capita GDP.

Using the HR approach, the situation improves slightly, but all countries continue to overshoot their fair allowances. Germany performs better than the others, overshooting its fair-share level by 35% (Figure 2.2).

Note: This figure presents fair-share allowances as a percentage of projected 2050 agricultural emissions. Higher values indicate that a region is closer to achieving its fair share (dashed red line). Values above 100% (green zone) mean that a region’s fair allowance is greater than its projected emissions, implying that it will meet or even surpass its fair share goal under one of the three approaches

Source: Authors

Using the IEPC framework, the situation improves further. Because fair-share allocations are based solely on projected 2050 population size, European countries receive higher allowances under this approach (on average21 MtCO2eq per year higher than AP and1.5 MtCO2eq higher than HR). This occurs because, although Europe’s population is small compared to the rest of the world, this demographic gap is much narrower than the gaps between the EU and other regions in historical agricultural emissions and economic capacity. Germany and Norway come the closest to attaining their fair-share levels,with allowances equivalent to 87% and 73%, respectively, of their 2050 projected emissions.

The Global Sustainability pathway brings significant progress toward fairer emission levels, particularly under the HR and IEPC approaches.

Source: Authors

Under HR, most EU countries narrow the gap between their fair allowances and their actual emissions. Greece achieves 83%compliance and Sweden 82%, while Germany does not consume the entirety of its carbon budget, with a surplus of 37% of its 2050 emissions.

Under IEPC, Germany, Greece and Sweden fully comply with their fair-share allocation, Finland closes 81% of its gap, the ‘rest of the EU’ group 69%, while Denmark remains far above its allocated allowance. Under AP, EU countries also improve their relative position by a factor of two or more, mainly because this pathway entails a significant reduction in their agricultural emissions by 2050. However, their high economic capacity continues to penalize them, resulting in fair allowances that still represent only a very small share of their projected 2050 emissions, between 1% and 7%.

This analysis highlights the importance of integrated modelling approaches. The emission reductions in the Global Sustainability pathway result from using an integrated approach that simultaneously addresses climate mitigation alongside food security, biodiversity conservation and economic development, avoiding a ‘carbon tunnel vision’. Through the FABLE methodology, countries developed pathways that balance multiple objectives, ensuring that emission reductions reinforce rather than undermine sustainability goals.

Achieving sustainability and fairness requires coordinated interventions across the EU food system. Shifts toward healthier diets, with increased consumption of fruits, vegetables and legumes while re-balancing protein intake from animal- to plant-based sources is critical. Supply-side measures include increasing EU competitiveness in these commodities to avoid the outsourcing of carbon footprints through imports, promoting sustainable livestock practices such as extensive grazing, and reducing food loss and waste. This combination of demand and supply measures creates opportunities for alternative land uses through agricultural land saving (Lafortune et al., 2024).

Fair-share approaches reveal wide differences in the mitigation burdens facing EU countries. The three methodologies generate markedly different allowances, highlighting that the choice of fairness criteria has significant implications for policy ambition. Nevertheless, the Global Sustainability pathway demonstrates that ambitious measures can bring European agriculture in alignment with fairness principles – Germany, for example, achieves a 37% surplus under the HR approach – however considerable disparities persist across countries.

The ESR Framework should explicitly address agricultural emissions. Currently lacking an agricultural carbon budget, the ESR leaves member states to determine agriculture’s share in mitigation efforts independently. Extending the CBDRRC principles specifically to the agriculture sector reveals hidden inequities that economy-wide targets may not show. Establishing clearer agricultural emission guidelines based on fairness principles could help governments assign a greater priority to agriculture in national climate mitigation efforts. This fair share methodology aims to inform the ESR framework and to highlight agriculture’s specific role, which deserves separate attention given its complexity.

The EU’s latest climate mitigation commitment introduced a binding intermediate target for 2040 of a 90% reduction in net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, compared with 1990 levels (Council of the EU, 2025). This commitment increases its previous ambition while reiterating concerns regarding competitiveness, the need for a just transition, uncertainty surrounding natural removals, and the diversity of conditions across EU member states. The post-2030 framework discussion will be critical to ensure that the latest commitments reflect fairness both within the agriculture sector and at the economy level, without diluting the EU’s original ambition reflected in the Paris Agreement and the Green Deal.

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By Dr. Anne Warchold and Prof. Prajal Pradhan

The bioeconomy has evolved from a biotechnology-centred concept to a transformative force for sustainable development, increasingly emphasising climate-change mitigation through low-carbon value chains that utilise biological resources to meet food, energy and material needs (Patermann and Aguilar, 2018). Acting as a bridge between global sustainability aspirations and local realities, the bioeconomy translates principles such as circularity, resource efficiency and climate neutrality into actionable pathways for transformation. Yet, examples illustrate both the promise and the complexity of bio-based transitions, as seen in algae-based biofuels (Abdullah et al., 2024; Kumar et al., 2016) and in wood use for buildings (Himes and Busby, 2020; Mishra et al., 2022), which offer low-emission solutions. At the same time, their expansion can intensify pressures on biomass supply, land use and life-cycle impacts, indicating that the bioeconomy is not inherently circular (Giampietro, 2019) or sustainable (Heimann, 2019).

Reflecting this nuance, newer definitions frame the bioeconomy around four interconnected pillars: environmental, economic, social and governance (Faulkner et al., 2024). These pillars align with the ‘aspirational principles and criteria for a sustainable bioeconomy’ (Figure 2.3), agreed upon by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Sustainable Bioeconomy Working Group (Bracco et al., 2019). In practice, advancing a sustainable bioeconomy will require policy and governance mechanisms that translate these principles into implementation.

Note: Bioeconomy framework with the 10 principles (P) for a sustainable bioeconomy (left, developed by Bracco et al., 2019) and the top bioeconomy principles and Sustainable Development Goal (SDGs) interactions (right), categorized by directionality and strength (%) for synergies and trade-offs. The interactions are identified in at least one-third of European countries

Given the inherent complexity and multisectoral nature of the bioeconomy, effective strategies will demand a multi-level framework that leverages synergies across the four pillars (Ahenkora, 2025), ensures coordination from local to global scales (Filipe, 2024), and aligns with global sustainability frameworks such as the 2030 Agenda (Schütte, 2018). Building on this foundation, the interaction between the bioeconomy and the SDGs is approached as a relationship between two intertwined systems – one defined by the FAO’s bioeconomy framework and the other by the 2030 Agenda.

Empirical analysis of causal interactions between the bioeconomy and SDGs across 48 European countries reveals that bioeconomic transitions over the last 20 years have generated both synergies and trade-offs for sustainable development (Figure 2.3) (Warchold and Pradhan, 2025). In Europe, the bioeconomy shows a particularly strong connection with SDG 13, supporting mitigation efforts through reduced fossil fuel dependence and innovation in low-carbon value chains. However, the expansion of bio-based production can also intensify land-use change and resource competition, leading to trade-offs with SDG 12 and SDG 15. Governance- and collaboration-related principles drive many of these interactions, indicating that institutional quality and cooperation are decisive in leveraging synergies. Country-level patterns highlight regional asymmetries. Northern and Western Europe tend to experience more synergy-dominant transitions, whereas Southern and Eastern Europe face stronger trade-off dynamics. Overall, the bioeconomy contributes moderately – rather than transformatively – to SDG progress.

Despite growing empirical evidence on interactions between the bioeconomy and SDG progress, European policy strategies have yet to reflect such systemic perspectives. An analysis of 29 bioeconomy strategies at national, regional, and EU levels reveals that sustainability dimensions are integrated unevenly: environmental and economic goals dominate, while social inclusion and governance remain peripheral (Warchold et al., 2025). The European Green Deal and the FAO’s framework position the bioeconomy as a transformative pathway to achieve the SDGs, and many countries have pledge to transition their national economies towards a bio-based model. Yet evidence points to fragmented implementation and weak systemic alignment ( ibid.).

Thus, across both policy and science domains, Europe faces an integration deficit: strong sectoral strategies but limited systemic alignment. Most strategies emphasise innovation, competitiveness, and resource efficiency, while neglecting evidence on trade-offs. Blind spots include the limited integration of cross-cutting principles such as collaboration, equity and institutional capacity. This fragmentation mirrors broader gaps within global sustainability assessments. An analysis of the IPCC’s Fifth and Sixth Assessment Reports found that, although references to all 17 SDGs have increased, coverage remains uneven and primarily focuses on environmental goals, with minimal attention to social and governance dimensions (Pradhan et al., 2025). Both the policy and scientific assessment communities, therefore, continue to operate in silos – sectoral or disciplinary– hindering a truly holistic understanding of sustainable development.

In many contexts, the bioeconomy serves as a bridge between the aspirational framing of the global 2030 Agenda and the concrete processes of transformation at local levels,making sustainability transitions more tangible, actionable and measurable. Holistically integrating sustainability considerations into bioeconomy strategies is therefore essential to leverage synergies and mitigate trade-offs in Europe’s sustainability transition. Taken together, the empirical and policy analyses highlight several implications for strengthening Europe’s bioeconomy and enhancing coherence in sustainability governance:

With 2025 marking the beginning of the final five years before the 2030 deadline, and progress being off track, SDG efforts must be intensified rather than abandoned (Biermann et al., 2023; Fuso Nerini et al., 2024). Yet global and regional SDG research and actions too often remain siloed, with strategies insufficiently aligned. Responding to these challenges, a sequence of workshops and research dialogues has engaged diverse stakeholders from across the SDG community to reflect on the 2030 Agenda and the future of sustainable development beyond 2030.

A workshop held in Groningen in 2024 examined how to strengthen scientific methods for investigating sustainability, and improve their communication and dissemination to better support science-based policy and systemic SDG acceleration. Discussions highlighted the need to operationalise the SDGs’ principles of integration and indivisibility through three interconnected foci – mapping SDG interactions, advancing integrative models, and developing decision-support tools – which together support more coherent and evidence-informed decision-making (Pradhan et al., 2024).

The Global Goals 2024 conference in Utrecht further advanced this debate by convening international experts to discuss the future of SDGs to and beyond 2030. The conference produced a roadmap structured around four priorities for renewing SDG governance: reforming the global sustainability governance architecture, enhancing national and subnational SDG coordination, consolidating goals and recalibrating targets and-indicators, and advancing a paradigm shift in economic policy (Biermann et al., 2024). In parallel, the discussions articulated an emerging policy vision integrating four complementary reforms– differentiation, dynamization, legalization and institutionalization – to strengthen the post-2030 agenda (Biermann et al., 2023).

Building on this momentum, a followup workshop in Groningen in 2025 shifted the focus towards practice, exploring transformative partnerships. By bridging science, policy, governance, the private sector and civil society, the workshop underscored the importance of strengthened interfaces to enable coherent, multi-level SDG implementation.

Collectively, these initiatives demonstrate Europe’s proactive engagement in shaping a more integrated, systems-oriented, participatory and forward-looking framework for accelerating sustainable development to 2030 and beyond.

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